European Communities - Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries by Sykes, Alan O. & Grossman, Gene M.
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship
2005
European Communities - Conditions for the




Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Alan O. Sykes & Gene M. Grossman, "European Communities - Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing
Countries," Principles Of Trade Law: The World Trade Organization 5 (2005).
European Communities - Conditions for the Granting of Tariff






The WTO case brought by India in 2002 to challenge aspects of the European
Communities' Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) brings fresh scrutiny to a policy area
that has received little attention in recent years - trade preferences for developing countries. The
idea for such preferences emerged from the first United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (IUNCTAD) in 1964. The ensuing negotiations led to Resolution 21(ii) at the
second session of UNCTAD in 1968, acknowledging "unanimous agreement" in favor of the
establishment of preferential arrangements.' Tariff discrimination violates the most-ftvorcd
nation (MFN) obligation of GATT Article 1, however, and thus the legal authority for preferential
tariff schemes had to await a GAiT waiver of this obligation, which came in 1971. ile waiver
was to expire after ten years, but the authority for preferences was extended by the GATT
Contracting Parties Decision of November 28, 1979 on Differential and More Favorable
Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, popularly known as the
"Enabling Clause,": and now incorporated into the law of the WTO along with the GATT itself.
While trade discrimination favoring developing countries is the essence of an) GSP
scheme, India's WTO complaint raised the question of what type of discrimination is permissible
- must all developing countries be treated alike, or can preference-granting nations discriminate
among them based on various sorts of criteria? The European system challenged by India
'See OECD Secretary General ( 1983).
'GATT, 26 Supp. BISD 203 (1980).
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2afforded more generous preferences to the ]cast developed countries, to dcvcloping nations that
undertook certain measurcs to protect the environment and labor rights, and to twelve nations
involved in efforts to combat drug trafficking. India originally challenged the cnvironmental,
labor and drug-related preferences, but latcr limited its complaint to only the drug preferences. A
WTO panel ruled in India's favor in late 2003.3 The WTO Appellate Body affinned the ruling in
India's favor in early 2004,4 although it modified the panel's findings in a way that seemingly
authorizes some differential treatment of developing contries based on their "development,
financial and trade needs."
The purpose of this paper is to review the current state of the law in the WTO system,
and to ask whether economic analysis can offer any wisdom about the proper extent of
"discrimination" through GSP measures. As shall become clear, the issues arc challenging onus,
both from a legal and an economic standpoint. There are good economic reasons to be concerned
about discrimination and reciprocity in GSP schemes, and respectable legal arguments that they
should he strictly limited. GSP benefits arc "gifts" of a sort, however, and tight limitations on
their terms may put an end to them altogether. It is exceedingly difficult to say whether
discrimination and reciprocity in GSP schemes make the trading community worse off or better
off over the long haul.
Section 2 provides legal and historical background, including a description of the GSP
schemes currently in place in the United States and Europe, and a thorough review of the recent
panel and Appellate Body decisions. Section 3 evaluates the Appellate Body decision from a
legal perspective and considers its possible implications for aspects of the U.S. and European
GSP schemes that were not challenged by India. Section 4 examines trade preferences from an
economic perspective, inquiring into the soundness of the GSP concept as a whole and asking
European Communities - Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries,
WT/DS246/R, December 1, 2003 (hereafter Panel Rep.).
4 European Communities - Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries,
WT/DS246/ABIR, April 7, 204 (hereafter AB Rep.).
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3whether some forms of "discrimination" are somehow better than others.
2. Legal Background
Resolution 21() at UNCTAD II in 1968 called for the establishment of a "generalized,
non-reciprocal, non-discriminatory system of preferences in favour of the developing countries,
including special measures in favour of the least advanced among the developing countries." It
further stated that such preferences had three objectives: to increase the export earnings of
developing countries, to promote their industrialization, and to accelerate their rates of economic
growth.
From the outset of serious negotiations within UNCTAD, however, it wa-s clear that the
"non-discriminatory system of preferences" envisioned by Resolution 21(ii) would in fact
embody considerable elements of "discrimination." Indeed, Resolution 21(u) on its face
contemplates discrimination in favor of the least developed countries. Further, the theory behind
GSP was that it would reduce the reliance of developing countries on exports of primary products
and promote industrialization. Accordingly, it was understood that manufactured goods would be
the main beneficiaries of preferences, and that agricultural products would be treated less
favorably. . This "discrimination" across sectors inevitably produces a kind of de facto
discrimination across beneficiaries - some beneficiaries have far greater capacity to produce the
manufactured goods that are designated for preferential treatment than others.
Beyond these features built into the conception of the system. political factors intruded
heavily on the willingness of nations to grant prelbrences across the board. Some developing
countries were seen as ideologically unacceptable recipients of preferences, many produced
manufactured goods in politically sensiti~e import sectors such as textiles and footwear, and the
possibility of import surges was a matter of significant concern. Thus, it quickly became clear
that if GSP schemes were to be politically viable in the major developed nations, they would have
to contain substantial additional limitations as to product coverage and beneficiaries, and he
'See OECD SucrctarN General (1983).
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accompanied by safeguards to address politically unacceptable increases in imports. No
mechanism existed for coordinating the evolution of national schemes on such matters, and thus
each developed rather differently.
Along the way, some preference-granting countries began to condition GSP benefits on
the willingness of beneficiary nations to cooperate on various policy margins, either by rewarding
cooperation with greater preferences or punishing its absence by withdrawing them. The
conception of GSP as a "non-reciprocal" program thus came under considerable pressure as well.
2.1. GSP Scope and Conditionality in the United States and Europe
UNCTAD reports that there are currently 16 national GSP schemes notified to the
UNCTAD secretariat -- Australia, Belarus, Bulgaria. Canada, the Czech Republic, the European
Community, Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Russian Federation, the Slovak
Republic, Switzerland, Turkey and the United States.6 They differ in significant detail, and
interested readers may consult the UNCTAD website for the particulars of various systems. Our
purpose here is simply to show how the more important schemes are riddled with provisions that
might be viewed as "discrimination" or "reciprocity," and for that purpose it will suffice to
consider only the schemes of the United States and the European Communities.
2.1.1. GSP in the United States
The GSP of the United States was first enacted in the Trade Act of 1974 and took effect
in 1976. It is presently authorized through 2006 and will then expire unless renewed by act of
Congress.
The statute has three sections -- a general grant of authority to the President to extend
preferences.7 a section on he designation of beneficiary countries,' and a section on the
designation of eligible products.9 Regarding the designation of beneficiary countries, the statute
See http'//www.unctad orrl'emnplatesoPate.asp?intltemtD=2309& lan =l, visited September 1, 2004.
19 U.S.C. §2461.
819 U.S.C. §2462.
9 19 U.S.C. §2463.
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begins with a short list of developed countries that are ineligible, It next Ibreloses beneficiary
status to eight other categories of nations: (1) "communist" countries (with exceptions): (2)
countries that are parties to an "arrangement" which withholds "supplies of vital commodity
resources from international trade" (aimed at OPEC); (3) countries that injure U.S. commerce by
affording preferences to other developed countries; (4) countries that expropriate the property of
U.S. citizens, including intellectual property, without just compensation; (5) countries that fail to
enforce binding arbitral awards in flivor of U.S. citizens; (6) countries that aid or abet terrorism or
lhil to take "steps to support the efforts or the United States to combat terrorism"; (7) countries
that have not taken steps "to afford internationally recognized worker rights"; and (8) countries
that fail to fulfill their "commitments to eliminate the worst forms of child labor." The last five
exclusions can be waived by the President in the "national economic interest." 10
The President has the discretion to confer beneficiary status on any nation not excluded
by the above factors, and the statute provides additional factors that tie President must consider
in exercising this discretion.' Along with the prospective beneficiary's interest in the program,
its level of development, and its treatment in the GSP schemes of other donor countries, the
President must also consider whether the country provides "equitable and reasonable access to
[its) markets and basic commodity resources" and "adequate and effective protection of
intellectual property rights," whether it has taken steps to reduce investment-distorting practices
and barriers to trade in services, and whether it takes steps to afford internationally recognized
worker rights. The statute also provides for "mandatory graduation" of "high income" countries,
without defining the term "'high income."' 2 At the low-income end of the spectrum. it also allows
the President to designate least-developed beneficiary nations, and to extend to them preferences
that are not extended to other developing nation!.
1o 19 U.S C §2,162(b)
"19 U.S.C. §2462(c).
19 U.S.C. §2462(e).
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Pursuant to these provisions, quite a number of nations that have become highly
successful exporters, such as Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia, have now been "graduated"
from the U.S. scheme due to their "high income" status. Several nations have had their GSP
status suspended temporarily due to problems in their worker rights practices, including
Nicaragua, Paraguay and Chile. Some of the benefits to Argentina wei suspended in 1997 over
an intellectual property dispute, and some of the benefits to Pakistan were suspended at one time
but later restored in return for cooperation in anti-terror efforts. Beneficiary status has also been
denied to a number of nations with whom the United States has had poor political relations (e.g.,
Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Syria)."1 It is assuredly possible that geopolitical considerations play a
broader role ,sub ro.sa in many of the decisions regarding beneficiary status, and there is no
mechanism to ensure that the various criteria are applied in careful and even-handed fashion.
We will not dwell at length on the provisions for the designation of eligible products. as
they are unlikely to he at the heart of any dispute over "discrimination" or "reciprocity" (although
they might be said to cause defacio discrimination as indicated). Because they are relevant to an
assessment of the economic effects of the system, however, we note three important details.
First, many sensitive items are excluded by statute from the GSP system, such as certain textile
and apparel products, watches, electronic products, steel products, footwear and leather products,
certain agricultural products, and "any other articles which the President determines to be import-
sensitive."'"
Second, a product from a particular beneficiary becomes ineligible for coverage if there is
no longer a "competitive need" (unless it comes from a least developed beneficiary). When
imports of a product from a single beneliciary exceed a certain monetary threshold (currently
$115 million), or 50 percent of all U.S. imports or the article in a calendar year, it must be
13 See generally UNCTAD. Generalized System of Preferences: Handbook on the Scheme of the United
States of America (2003); UNCTAD, Generalized System of Preferences: List of Beneficiaries (2001).
N 19 U.S.C. §2463(b).
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7removed as an eligible product unless the President executes a "waiver."15
Third, all items are subject to rules of origin. In general, a product will not be decmed to
originate in a beneficiary nation unless it meets a 35 percent value added test - the value of tile
input products produced in the beneficiary nation, plus the value of processing in that nation,
must equal 35 percent of the value of the finished good,"
2.1.2. GSP in the European Communities
The European approach to GSP has evolved considerably over time. The system in place
through 1994 relied hea% ily on quantitative limits for the importation of duty-free or reduced-duty
industrial and agricultural products. The arrangement challenged by India, which is now
authorized through the end of 2005, relies to a much greater extent on "tariff modulation" and
"special incentive" arrangements, coupled with provisions for country and sectoral graduation as
well as an "everything but arms" arrangement for least-developed countries."
The tariff modulation arrangement classifies goods into "very-sensitive," "sensitive,"
"semi-sensitive" and "non-sensitive" products. Roughly speaking and with a few exceptions.
beneficiary countries then receive tariff reductions of IS percent, 30 percent, 65 percent and 100
percent, respectively, off the usual MFN rate for goods in each category. Least-developed
countries, however, receive duty-fIree treatment on goods in all categories except armaments.
Countries can be completely graduated from the system based on a "development index," and
individual exports from particular countries can also be graduated based on a combination of'
considerations relating to the development index and to the beneficiary's market share or degree
of specialization in a particular product.
"Special incentive arrangements" provide additional margins of piclerencc to nations that
" 19 U S.C. §2463(c)-(d).
' 19 U.S.C. §2463(a)(2).
1 See generally Council Regulation (EC) No. 2502001 of 10 December 2001 applying a scheme of
generalized tariff preferences for the period from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004; UNCTAD,
Generalized System of Preferences" llandbook on the Scheme of the European Community (2002).
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apply for them and prove their eligibility. The labor arrangement applies to developing countries
that have adopted the substance of the standards required by several International Labor
Organization Conventions relating to, inter alia, forced labor, collective bargaining rights, non-
discrimination principles, and child labor. The environmental incentive arrangement applies to
goods originating in countries with tropical forests that can establish their adherence to
international standards regarding the sustainable management of tropical forests.
The special arrangements supporting measures to combat drugs are made available to
eleven South or Central American countries, plus Pakistan, that are involved in efforts to reduce
drug trafficking. They too provide additional margins of preference on a range of products,
essentially exempting goods from sector-specific graduation rules that would otherwise apply to
them.
Finally, the scheme contains a number of "temporary withdrawal and safeguard"
provisions. The most important are aimed at import surges, and allow preferences to be
suspended after an investigation of such developments. Other provisions for temporary
withdrawal apply to situations where the beneficiary country has been shown to have tolerated
slaery, violated worker rights, exported goods of prison labor, failed to take appropriate means
to control drug trafficking, engaged in fraud with respect to rules of origin, engaged in "unfair
trade practices," or infringed the objectives of certain fishery conventions.
The policies favored by the European system differ somewhat from the policies
encouraged by the United States, although there are notabl, similarities. Both systems certainly
exhibit a significant degree of "discrimination" and "reciprocity" in their design and in their
application that goes well beyond simply the more favorable treatment of least-developed nations
that was envisioned by UNCTAD Resolution 23(ii).
2.2. India's Complaint and Its Legal Basis'
As noted earlier, India's original complaint before the WTO challenged the labor,
enviromnental, and drug-related preferences in the European GSP scheme, but India later
restricted its challenge to the drug-related preferences. Its decision to restrict the scope of its
HeinOnline  --  THE WTO CASE LAW OF 2003 12 March 30, 2005
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complaint has resulted in an Appellate Body decision that leaves open many questions about the
permissible scope of "discrimination," as shall be seen.
The legal foundation for India's challenge begins with GATT Article I. which requires
that any "advantage, favour, privilege or immunity" granted by one member nation to the product
of another and relating, inter alia, to "customs duties and charges of any kind." must also be
granted "immediately and unconditionally" to like products originating in other member nations.
This pi inciple is commonly termed the "most-favored nation" (MFN) obligation of GATT.
Any GSP scheme, of course, involves tariff discrimination by the preference-granting
nation. It thus requires some derogation from the legal prohibition in Article I, which was first
allowed under a ten-year waiver approved by the GATT membership in 197 1. During the Tokyo
Round, hoikever, GATT members negotiated an agreement to make the authority permanent,
embodied in the so-called "Enabling Clause."
The relevant text of the Enabling Clause provides:
.l. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article I of the General Agreement,
contracting parties may accord differential and more favourable ticatment to
developing countries, without according such treatment to other contracting
parties.
2. The provisions of paragraph I apply to the following:
(a) Preferential tariff treatment accorded by developed contracting
parties to products originating in developing countries in accordance with the
Generalized System of Preferences... (ornaIl riomte)
(z) Special treatment of the least developed among the developing
countries in the context of any general or specific measures in favour of
developing countries.
3. Any differential and more favourable treatment provided under this
clause:
(a) shall be designed to facilitate and promote the trade of
developing countrier and not to raise barriers to nr create undue difficulties for
the trade of any other contracting parties;
HeinOnline  --  THE WTO CASE LAW OF 2003 13 March 30, 2005
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(b) shall not constitute an impediment to tile reduction or
elimination of tariffs and other restrictions to trade on a most-favoured-nation
basis;
(c) shall in the case of such treatment accorded by developed
contracting parties to developing countries be designed and, if necessary,
modified, to respond positively to the development, financial and trade needs of
developing countries".
(original footnote) As described in the Decision of the CONTRACTING
PARTIES of 25 June 1971, relating to the establishment of "generalized, non-
reciprocal and non discriminatory preferences bcneficial to the developing
countries."
The Enabling Clause plainly allows nations to depart from the MFIN obligation to provide
more favorable tariff treatment to goods from developing countries, and to provide even more
favorable treatment for goods from the least-developed countries. Its text is otherwise silent on
the range of goods to be covered by preferences, on the permissibility of other forms of
"discrimination" among beneficiaries, and on the acceptability of attaching conditions
("reciprocity") to preferential benefits. Footnote 3, however, states that the "Generalized System
of Preferences" contemplated by the Enabling Clause is the system contemplated in the 1971
waiver, which in turn referred back to the "generalized, non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory"
system of preferences discussed under the auspices of UNCTAD.
Footnote 3 raises a number of issues not directly addressed by India's complaint. What is
meant by the requirement of "generalized" preferences - does this obligation place any limits on
the exclusion of particular products from GSP schemes? What does the obligation to provide
"non-reciprocal" preferences imply about the imposition of conditions for the granting of
preferences?
India's complaint put these issues to the side and focused instead on the requirement of
non-discriminatory preferences. According to India, when a nation grants a preference on a
particular product, it must extend that preference to all developing countries, subject only to the
proviso that least-developed nations can receive greater preferences. Because the drug-related
preferences in the European scheme afford special benefits to twelve enumerated beneficiaries
HeinOnline  --  THE WTO CASE LAW OF 2003 14 March 30, 2005
that are not ro-extensivc with the set of least-developed nations, India contended, the preferences
failed the requirement of non-discrimination under the Enabling Clause and in turn violated
GATT Article I.
2.3. The European Response and the Panel Decision
Before the panel, Europe's first response was a formalistic claim that the Enabling Clause
did not create an exception to Article I of GATT, but removed GISP schemes altogether from the
coverage of Article 1. The distinction was important, according to Europe, because India's
complaint alleged a violation of Article I but not of the Enabling Clause por se, and the panel
should only adjudicate claims brought before it. The panel quickly put this issue to the side (over
a dissent), however, and read the Enabling clause as an exception to the MIN obligation of
Article I - buo for the exception, preferences would violate Article 1, and lndia's allegation of an
Article I violation squarely raised the proper issue. Further, following WTO precedent on
'exceptions" to primary obligations, the panel held that Europe had the burden of demonstrating
that its program falls within the exception afforded by the Enabling Clause.
8
Once the panel ruled that GSP preferences fall under Article 1, the panel had little
difficulty in concluding that India made out a prima facie case of a violation.tV The panel then
turned to the question whether Europe could invoke the Enabling Clause and thereby establish its
"affirmative defense." On this front, Europe had three main arguments. First, it pointed to
paragraph 3(c) of the Enabling Clause, which provides that differential treatment shall "be
designed and, if necessary. modified, to respond positively to the development, financial and
trade needs of developing countries." Europe argued that different developing countries have
different "development. financial and trade needs," and that this provision authorizes (and indeed
requires) preferences to be modified to respond to those differing needs, inevitably producing
differences in the preferences across beneficiaries.
IS Panel Rep. ', 7.31-7.54.
I, Panel Rep. J 7.55-7.60.
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Second, Europe argued that India misinterpreted the requirement in footnote 3 that
preferences be "non-discriminatory." For Europe, "discrimination" involved arbitrary differences
in the treatment of similarly situated entities - as long as differences in treatment could be
justified by a legitimate objective, and the differences were reasonable in pursuit of that objective,
no "discrimination" should be found.20
Third, Europe argued that paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause, which authorizes
"prefcrential tariff treatment accorded by developed contracting parties to products originating in
developing countries," does not require preference-granting nations to afford preferences to all
developing countries. Had the drafters meant to require that preferences be extended to all,
Europe suggested, they could have inserted the word "all" into the text.
India's response to the first and third arguments was that the term "developing countries"
in paragraphs 3(c) and 2(a) should be read as all developing countries, i.e., developing countries
as a group. Preferences should respond to the "development, financial and trade needs" of those
countries as a group, claimed India, and should not vary in accordance with any individual needs.
Paragraph 2(a) likewise provides no authority for picking and choosing among developing
countries in India's view. This proposition is reinforced by footnote 3 and its reference to non-
discriminatory preferences, according to India, which should be read to require formally identical
treatment subject only to the exceptions specifically contemplated by the Enabling Clause.
The panel addressed each of Europe's arguments separately, but its analysis of all three
was strikingly parallel. The panel found that the relevant portions of the text of the Enabling
Clause were ambiguous. Following the Vienna Convention, it then turned to the context of the
treaty text, its object and purpose, and other aids to interpretation. It noted that the Enabling
Clause referred back to the waiver granted in 1971, which in turn made reference to "mutually
acceptable" preferences. The "mutually acceptable" preferences were apparently those
7o Robert ltowse advances another line of argument that Europe did not pursue in the case. He suggests
that the "obligations" in footnote 3, particularly the obligation to afford "non-discriminatory" preferences,
were never intended to have binding legal effect but were merely aspirational. For a thorough vetting of
this perspective, see Howse (2003).
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negotiated under the auspices of UNCTAD and embodied in the "Agreed Conclusions" that
eventually emerged from the ongoing negotiations in UNCTAD. Tile panel thus concluded that
the Fnahling Clause should he interpretcd to pcnnit the sort of preferential system contemplated
by the UNCTAD negotiators, memorialized in the Agreed Conclusions, and incorporated by
implicit reference into the 1971 waiver.
The panel then reviewed the Agreed Conclusions at some length. It found that thcy
anticipated sonic limitations on product coverage - most manufactured goods would be covered,
with limited exceptions, with only case-by-case coverage for agriculture. But nothing in the
negotiating history seemcd to contemplate discrimination among developed countries on the basis
of their development or other "needs," except for the special treatment of least-developed nations.
The only other potential limitations on coverage addressed by the UNCTAD negotiations
concerned measures to withdraw preferences or to set quantitative ceilings when exporters
achieve a certain competitive level along with safeguard measures to address import surges.
On the basis of these findings, the pancl accepted India's suggestion that the phrase
"developing countries" in paragraph 2(a) refers to all developing countries,21 and implicitly as
well its suggestion that the reference to "developing countries" in paragraph 3(c) is to developing
countries as a group. According to the panel, paragraph 3(c) does not authorize differences in
preferences except those contemplated by the UNCTAD negotiators.22 Finally, the panel found
no basis in the text or relevant negotiating history for Europe's suggestion that the requirement of
"non-discriminatory" preirences was satisfied as long as differences in treatment resulted from
objective criteria relating to legitimate objectives. Rather, footnote 3 "requires that identical tariff
preferences under GSP schemes be provided to all developing countries without differentiation,"
excepting only the differential treatment expressly contemplated in the Agreed Conclusions.
23
21 Panel Rep. 7.174.
22 Panel Rep. T7.116
:3 Panel Rep. 
€7.161,
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Europe's final line of defense was an eflort to invoke GATT Article XX(b), which allows
measures *'necessary to protect human...health." The panel was not persuaded, questioning
whether the drug-related preferences were genuinely aimed at the protection of human health in
Europe, questioning their "necessity," and questioning whether they amounted to an arbitrary
discrimination among beneficiary nations where similar conditions prevail in violation of the
chapeau to Article XX. 24 Europe did not appeal these findings.
2.4. The Appellate Body Decision
The Appellate Body affirmed the proposition that the Enabling Clause is an exception to
GATT Article I. India had the burden of raising the question whether Europe's system was
consistent with the Enabling Clause and did so; Europe then had the burden of proving its
consistency.
Europe did not appeal the panels interpretation of paragraph 3(c) of the Enabling Clause,
as the panel had not made any explicit "findings" regarding the consistency of the European drug
preferences with paragraph 3(c). The appeal was thus confined to the question whether the
European system was consistent with paragraph 2(a) and with its footnote 3 requiring "non
discriminatory" preferences. On the latter issue, the Appellate Body found that the ordinary
meaning of the term "non discriminatory" did not permit it to choose between the competing
views of discrimination put forth hy India and the European Communities, 5 Both parties agreed
that "discrimination" entails disparate treatment of those "similarly situated," btl disagreed on
what it means to be "similarly situated" - an appeal to the ordinary meaning of the term
"discrimination" does not resolve such a disagreement.
The Appellate Body then turned to paragraph 3(c) of the Enabling Clause to provide
further context for the interpretation of the non-discrimination obligation, and accepted the
European argument that the absence of the word "all" before "developing countries" implies that
24 Panel Rep. 7 236.
AB Rep. 151-52.
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the text imposes no obligation to treat all developing countries alike."' Further, both parties
apparently conceded that the development needs of various countries may differ. Accordingly,
the Appellate Body was "of the view that, by requiring developed countries to 'respond
positively' to the 'needs of developing countries'. which are varied and not homogeneous.
paragraph 3(c) indicates that a GSP scheme may he 'non-discriminatory' even if'identical' tariff
treatment is not accorded to 'all' GSP beneficiaries" 7 It thus reversed the panel's finding to the
contrary. Likewise, the Appellate Body reversed the panel's finding that the reference to
"developing cojntries" in paragraph 2(a) was to all developing countries.29  It held that
preference-granting countries are permitted to treat beneficiaries differently when such
differences "respond positively" to varying "development. financial and trade needs."
The non-discrimination requirement is not without bite in the view of the Appellate
Body, however, because it does require "that identical tariff treatment must be available to all
GSP beneficiaries with the 'development, financial [or] trade need' to which the differential
treatment is intended to respond."29 Because there was no specific finding by the panel regarding
the consistency of the European drug-related preferences with paragraph 3(c). the Appellate Body
was prepared to accept arguendo that drug trafficking relates to a "development need." Even so,
the preferences would still fail the non-discrimination test unless "the European Communities
proves, at a minimum, that the preferences granted under the Drug Arrangements are available to
all GSP beneficiaries that are similarly affected by the drug problem." 30
The Appellate Body then held that the European Communities lailed to carry the burden
ol' proof on this issue. It emphasized that the drug-related preferences were available only to a
26 AB Rep. 159.
2 AB Rep. 165.
2SAB Rep. 1175-76
29 AB Rep 180,
10 ld.
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"closed list" of twelve countries. The regulation creating the preferences did not set out any
criteria for the selection of the countries, and it did not provide any mechanism for adding or
deleting countries as their circumstances changed. Under these conditions, Europe failed to
demonstrate that its preferences were non-discriminatory.
Along the way, the Appellate Body contrasted the labor and environmental incentive
arrangements in the European GSP scheme. Unlike the situation with the drug-relnted
preferences, the regulation creating the labor and environmental incentives provides "detailed
provisions setting out the procedure and substantive criteria that apply to a request... to become a
beneficiary under either of those special incentive arrangements." 3' The Appellate Body thus
hinted that those aspects of the European scheme might pass the non-discrimination test if
challenged, but did not speak to the concurrent issue of whether the labor and environmental
incentives respond to legitimate "developmcnt, financial and trade needs."
3. Legal Commentary
3.1. An Assessment ofthe WTO Outcome
As with most hard cases, it is difficult to say which side was "right" on a purely legal
basis. The case is hard because, as both the panel and the Appellate Body acknowledged, the text
of the Enabling Clause is ambiguous. Even assuming that footnote 3 vas intended to create a
binding non-discrimination obligation, as did the parties to the case, the absence of any definition
for the concept opens the door to a wide range of interpretations. Any student of civil rights law,
constitutional law, or even GATT Articles I and Ill is well aware of the fact that "discrimination"
is an extremely elastic notion. The phrase "developing countries" in paragraphs 2(a) and 3(c) is
equally difficult to pin down. It is surely true, as the Appellate Body notes, that the drafters
could have said "all developing countries," but did not. Yet, it is equally true that the drafters
might have said "particular" or "selected" developing countries, or used some other phrasing to
signify the acceptability of differential treatment, but did not. As always, inferences about the
" AB Rcp. 1182.
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intentions of drafters from phrasings that they did Plo employ are questionable at best.
In the face of such ambiguit), the panel relied primarily on historical context and the
UNCTAD negotiations to give footnote 3 sonic definitive content. The 1971 waiver referenced
in footnote 3 indeed contemplates "mutually acceptable- preferences, and the Agreed
Conclusions from the 1JNCTAD negotiations may well have been a good indicator of what was
"mutually acceptable." The panel was also correct to note that a major impetus for the UNCTAD
negotiations was to back away from the historical patchwork of discriminator%, preferences
already in place in favor of a generali:ed system of preferences. From these facts the panel
inferred that any discrimination had to be limited to what was expressly contemplated by the
Agreed Conclusions.
The panel's approach resonates somewhat with an economic perspective on the GSP
system that we develop in the next section. and which may help to clarify the object and purpose
of the Enabling Clause as an aid to interpretation. An economic understanding of die MFN
obligation suggests uiat it arises to avert certain negative externalities that would otherwise arise
relating to bilateral opportunism and to erosion of the value of trade concessions. The situation
prior to the UNCTAD negotiations was one in which the problems addressed by the MFN
obligation had resurfaced because of a patchwork of discriminatory preferences in the trade
policies of developed nations, often dating from the colonial era. The UNCTAD negotiations
may be viewed as an eflort to bring the attendant negative externalities under greater discipline,
and the Agreed Conclusions may be seen as the embodiment of a negotiated arrangement with the
Follovving central characteristics: The developed nations agreed that they would tolerate the
negative consequences for themselves associated with preferences for developing nations, at least
within the agreed parameters. But they also committed themselves to ameliorate the negative
consequences of discriminatory preferences for developing nations by moving toward the
"generalized, non-reciprocal and non discriminator, preferences" contemplated by the 1971
waiver.
This understanding of the economic rationale for the UNCTAD negotiations lends further
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support to the conclusion of the panel. If developed nations are allowed to engage in whatcver
degree of discrimination they wish without legal constraint, an essential purpose of the UNCTAD
negotiations is clearly jeopardized. And even if nations are only allowed to aflbrd differnntial
treatment according to their assessment of the individual "development, financial and trade
needs" of beneficiary countries, the danger still arises that they will use such authority to justify
discriminatory policies that benefit countries in favor rather than for any legitimate purpose. For
these reasons, it is entirely plausible that negotiators would want to limit discrimination to fairly
narrow considerations, such as status as a least-developed nation, and to forbid it otherwise.
But an important counterargument must be acknowledged. The parties to the UNCTAD
negotiations were aware of the potential political impediments to the implementation of GSP, and
might well have thought that compromise on various margins, in ways not fully anticipated
during the negotiations, would be mutually preferable to political impasse and the Stauls quo an e.
A 1968 OECD report, for example, embraced the principle that "preferences should be granted to
any country, territory or area claiming developing status (principle of self-election), but
preference-giving countries might decline to grant such treatment to a particular country on
compelling grounds." (emphasis addcd)32 The scope of the term "compelling grounds" was not
made clear. We cannot rule out the possibility that donor countries may have been unwilling to
give much of consequence had they imagined that a tight prohibition on discrimination and
reciprocity would apply going forward, and developing countries may well have been willing to
take what they could get. This proposition is very much in the spirit of the argument put forward
elsewhere by Robert Howse (2003), who contends that the language of footnote 3 was never
intended to create a binding legal obligation.
It is also noteworthy that major GSP schemes put in place afler UNCTAD 11 from the
outset contained exemptions and restrictions that were not specifically contemplated in the
" See UNCTAD (198 1, p.2 1).
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Agreed Conclusions. The long list of factors that foreclose beneficiary status under U.S. law, for
example, has remained the same in large part since the Trade Act of 1974."3 These early practices
of donor countries were firmly in place at the time of the negotiations that resulted in the
Enabling Clausc. 34 Had it been the intention of the Tokyo Round negotiators to outlaw the sort of
conditionality that had emerged, for example, in the U.S. scheme devised by the Trade Act of
1974, they might well have done so more forcefully than by a somewhat oblique reference in
footnote 3 to the system contemplated by the also somewhat oblique 1971 waiver.
From this latter perspective, the Appellate Body might be seen to have the better of the
argument. It is certainly difficult to quarrel with its conclusion that Europe's interpretation of the
phrase "devcloping countries" in paragraphs 2(a) and 3(c) of the Enabling Clause is a
linguistically plausible one, and for the reasons noted above it is not entirely clear that the non-
discrimination obligation in footnote 3 rules out any differential treatment not expressly
contemplated by the Agreed Conclusions. One might even wonder whether the Appellate Body
goes too far in suggesting that donor countries must prove that any differential treatment is
justified by reference to differences in "development, financial and trade needs.*' The supporters
of the 1971 waiver could have anticipated that GSP schemes would contain a wide range of other
conditions and restrictions to make them politically saleable in the donor countries.
In short, we concur with both the Appellate Body and the panel in their finding that the
language or the Enabling Clause is ambiguous, and is insufficient on its own to resolve the
dispute. It is thus appropriate to resort to other aids to interpretation in accordance with the
Vienna Convention, including the "context" of the treaty language and its "object and purpose."
There can be little doubt that a central "object and purpose" ol'the UNCTAD negotiations was to
reduce discrimination in trade preferences subject to some enumerated exceptions, and that both
33 The various restrictions and limntations on the early European scheme are described at some length in
Bomiann ct at. (1981 ).
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the 1971 waiver and the Enabling Clause may be said to incorporate this goal by reference. The
approach of the panel surely docs the most to promote this objective. But we must also bear in
mind that GSP benefits are a "gift" of sorts, and that donors may well have been unwilling to
confer them if constrained by tight non-discrimination (and other) requirements. Developing
nations may well have been aware that various fonus of conditionality would be the quidpro quo,
and the 1979 Enabling Clause could easily have done much more to condemn it in clear language
if that was the intention of its drafters. Perhaps unfortunately, therefbre, an appeal to the "object
and purpose" of the Enabling Clause is also less than conclusive.
One virtue of the panel's approach, to be sure, is that it provides reasonably clear
guidance for the future as to what is pennissible and what is not. Except for the differential
treatment expressly anticipated by the Agreed Conclusions, no discrimination is permissible.
The approach advocated by Howse also admits of easy judicial administration, as he would find
no binding legal obligation at all in footnote 3. The approach of the Appellate Body, by contrast,
steering a middle course of sorts, leaves fundamental and potentially thorny questions
unanswered, as the next section will indicate.
3.2. Implications of the Appellate Body Decision [or Other Aspects ofExisting GSP Schemes
The Appellate Body ruling establishes two important principles: (1) footnote 3 of the
Enabling Clause is a binding legal obligation, requiring "generalized, non-reciprocal and non
discriminatory preferences;" and (2) donor countries may nevertheless afford differential
treatment to beneficiary nations if it is based on differences in their "development, financial and
trade needs." These principles raise a wide array of issues to which the Appellate Body has not
yet spoken.
Most obviously, what counts as a development, financial or trade need? The Appellate
Body did not rule on the question whether drug trafficking creates a "development need," finding
34 To be sure, some of the restrictions came under early criticism from commentators as a departure from
the principles of non-discrimination and non-reciprocity. See, e.g., UNCTAD (198 1, p. 39).
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it unnecessar' to address matter- on %hiieh the panel made no finding. Yet. it seems clear that the
drug-related preferences were enacted for the benefit of Europe, to reward cooperation in its
efforts to reduce traffic in drugs toward Europe, rather than to assist the beneficiaries in
addressing any perceived "development need" of their own. Many of tile other criteria for
beneficiary status found in modem GSP schemes, such as failure to aid in efforts to combat
international terrorism, failure to enforce arbitral awards, or participation in a cartel such as
OPEC, seem still farther removed from any "needs" of the beneficiary country. Perhaps incentive
arrangements pertaining to labor rights and environmental protection can fit more comfortably
into the rubric of "needs," but its scope remains completely open at this stage.
One also imagines that some constraint must exist on the magnitude of the differential
treatment that is permissible to address heterogeneous development, financial and trade needs.
Even if drug-trafficking qualifies as a "need," for example, could a donor country deny
preferences altogether to nations that do not have a serious drug-trafficking problem while
extending substantial preferences to those that do? If the differential treatment must be justified
by different "needs," it would seem to follow that it cannot exceed the amount required to address
any need adequately. But how would one quantify that amount or otherwise place a principled
limit on it?
Related. do donor countries have unfettered discretion to select the "needs" that they will
address through differential treatment and to ignore others? Europe limits its environmental
incentives in its GSP scheme to the protection of tropical forests. For example, but suppose a
nation with no tropical forest can make the case that its exceptional air pollution problem poses a
greater obstacle to its development than an), obstacles posed by the possible loss of tropical forest
elsewhere? Would a failure to afford differential treatment to assist it in addressing its air
pollution problem then amount to -discrimination?"
The puzzle as to %%hat constitutes impermissible discrimination is only part of the bigger
picture. The word "generalized" in footnote 3 refers not only to the universe of beneficiary
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nations, but also to the scope of product coverage. The GSP system envisioned by the UNCTAD
negotiators would provide broad coverage for manufactured and semi-manufactured items,
limited only by quantitative ceilings or safeguard measures to address concerns about import
surges. Can the complete exclusion of enumerated import-sensitive manufactured products, as in
the U.S. statute as one example, be squared with the obligation to provide "generalized"
preferences?
The obligation to afford "non-reciprocal" prefcrences also potentially imperils much of
the conditionality in modem GSIP schemes. Sonic of those conditions, such as the U.S.
requirement that beneficiaries provide support for efforts to combat terrorism and respect arbitral
awards in favor of U.S. nationals, require reciprocity essentially on their face. Others can surely
be characterized as requiring reciprocity, such as the special incentives on labor and
environmental matters in the European scheme. If footnote 3 truly prohibits "reciprocity," it
seemingly poses an enormous threat to the elements of conditionality that have been present in
various GSP schemes since their inception, and that may be essential to their perpetuation as
political matter.3
In short, the Appellate Body decision puts in question many prominent features of the
U.S., European and other GSP schemes, features that in some cases have been part of those
schemes from the outset. It invites future challenges by countries that suffer trade diversion
because of discrimination or reciprocity. even perhaps by developed nations. Donor countries
will have the burden to prove their compliance with the Enabling Clause since it has now been
ruled to be an "exception" to GATT Article 1. That burden may prove a difficult one to carry.
" We note in passing another limitation on reciprocity contained in the Enabling Clause. Paragraph 5
provides, in pertinent part, that "developing contracting parties shall therefore not seek, neither shall
developing contracting parnies be required to make, concessions that are inconsistent with the latter's
development, financial and trade needs." Although this obligation arises in the context of"rade
negotiations," GSP conditionality might be viewed as setting up a "negotiation" ofsortg, and paragraph 5
would then limit the "concessions" demanded to matters not inconsistent with development, financial and
trade needs.
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If successful challenges to GSP schemes multiply going forward, it is entirely possible
that donor countries will choose to forego GSI' arrangements altogether. Nothing requires donor
countries to maintain schcmes that are no longer palatable politically, and some (including the
U.S. and European schemes) are structured to expire on their own unless the political will to
renew thelm is present. A key question going forward. then. may he whether additional
challenges wvill be brought as time goes on, or whether instead the interested nations will
conclude that it is not in their mutual interest to rock the boat.
4. Economic Analysis
The legal commentary in Section II suggests several questions about GSP schemes and
their place in the multilateral trading system. Do these schemes further the development goals for
which they were designed? What effect do the schemes have on the economic Nelfare of
countries that are not granted preferential treatment? And why might the contracting parties wish
to regulate the extent of differential treatment and the conditions attached by donors when, after
all, the GSP schemes are "gifts" from the developed countries to their less developed trading
partners?
4.1. Economic Ehfficts oftTaril1"Preferences
We begin by describing the economic eflcts of tariff preferences both in the country or
countries that receive the special treatment and in other trading partners of the preference-
granting country. Suppose first that preferences arc granted to a "small country" or to a group of
countries that collectively are small. In the parlance of trade theory, a qmall country is one that
cannot affect the world prices of the goods that it trades, because its imports and exports are
insignificant relative to the size of world markets. When exporters in such a country face a given
world price of p and an MFN ad valorem tariff rate of tA,!..v they must sell their output for p*(I+
b,, %) to be competitise in the foreign market. This price prevails as well in the home market of
the exporting country, because producers will not sell at home for less than what they can earn on
world maikcts, nor will they able to sell ]or more given that they choose to export at that price in
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a competitive equilibrium. Figure 1 shows the production and consumption levels in the
exporting country prior to the time it is granted tariff preferences.
The preferences excuse the exporters in the small country from the generally applicable
tariff. These exporters arc too small to affect the internal price in the preference-granting
country, -. hich remains at p'. So, the exporters now can charge this higher amount and remain
competitive in the foreign market. The figure shows that output expands as a result of the higher
sales price, and that consumption in the exporting country contracts. For both reasons, exports
grow.
The tariff preferences provide a "terms of trade" benefit to the exporting country.
Producers gain, both because their original sales fetch a higher price and because they expand
output to the point where marginal cost equals p*. Some of the gain to producers comes at the
expense of domestic consumers, who lose surplus because they face a higher domestic price." °
But the country enjoys a net gain in welfare equal to.the trapezoidal area between the supply and
the demand curves and bounded by p' and p'!ll+t.%WfN) Note that the price for exporters in
countries that do not receive the preferential treatment remains at p'I/(]+ tAfF). Thus, all growth
in trade due to the GSP reflects trade creation; the other (small) countries that export to the
preference-granting country suffer no harm in this case.
3( Our analysis is predicated on the assumption that the prevailing tariff in the country that receives
preferential treatment is greater than the MFN tariff in the country that grants the preferences. This
assumption is reasonable in most cases, as average rates of protection are much higher in developing
countries than in developed countries. If the assumption is violated, the preference-receiving country
would export all of its industry output at price p', while domestic consumers would be served by imports
from third-countries, where the prevailing price is pI/(l+N) and so the tariff-inclusive import price would
be less than p . In the event, the terms of trade gain for the preference-receiving country is even larger than
that described here, but it remains true that the preferences generate no negative externalities for third
countries












Now suppose that preferences are granted to a large country or to a group of countries that
collectively is large. This situation is depicted in Figure 2. As before, the granting of preferences
will : :nd to raise the intcrnal price in the prefcrence-receiving country, as shown on tie lell-hand
panel. But now the impact of the export growth on the world price cannot be ignorcd. The right-
hand panel shows that total world supply to the donor country has expanded, which means that
the market clearing price falls from p* to p',,, (,. fThe prelbrence-receiving country still enjoys a
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terms-of-tradc gain. but not as great as before." Welfare rises by the (smaller) area bounded by
the demand and supply curves and by the price lines p'(1+1rIF) and Pg'oS s.
Figure 2
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In this case, the export growth in the preference-receiving country reflects both trade
creation and trade diversion. The trade creation is reflected in the fact that the GSP reduces the
internal price in the preference-granting country, so its consumption expands and its home
production contracts. The reduction in its home production is (more than) made up by its imports
from the preference-receiving country. But the fall in the world price produces a terms-of trade
loss for other countries that export to the prelerence-granting country. These countries see their
exports displaced in part by goods from the preference-receiving country. They also earn less
from what they do sell, and their welfare falls. In this case, the GSP imposes a negative
externality on the exporting countries that do not qualify for the preferential treatment, It is this
"'The computational results preented by Brown (1987, 1989) show terms of trade gains from U.S. and
European GSP schemes for most beneficiary countries.
p.' *f,,
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negative externality that might explain why a country like India would object to tile European
GSP scheme."
4.2. Does GSP Promote "Development"
The Preamble to the 1971 Waiver, which provided the initial authority for tariff
preferences that would othenvise violate GATT Article 1. states "... that a principle aim of the
Contracting Parties is promotion of the trade and export earnings of developing countries for the
furtherance of their economic development." To what extent can tariff preference schemes
promote trade and export earnings for the furtherance of economic development? We address
this question in the light of our brief analysis of the economic effects of tariff preference schemes,
As our analysis has shown, the granting of tariff preferences does serve to promote trade
volume and export earnings in the preference-receiving countries. The magnitude of this effect
for existing GISP schemes is a matter of some debate, but a consensus view might be that the
revenue gains have been modest but not trivial 29 Surely the gains could be larger but for the
many product exclusions that the preference-granting countries have introduced to minimize pain
to their own import-competing industries. But whatever their precise magnitude, the terms-of-
trade gains provide a form of "development aid" inasmuch as they boost incomes for owners of
export concerns and quite possibly for factors of production such as unskilled labor that are used
intensively in export sectors in the developing countries. In this sense, the GSP schemes can be
seen as serving their putative purpose.
Arguably. however. the contracting panics had more in mind. UNCTAD Resolution
21(ii) also made reference to a desire to promote industrialization and economic growth. To the
3' We also duly note the fact that the drug-related preferences in the European scheme extended to Pakistan
and not to India, a situation that India may have round objectionable for political reasons.
" Sapir and L.undbcrg (1984). Karsentv and Laird (1986). and MacPhee and Oguledo (1991) all find
modest gains in export volume and export earnings for beneficiaries of GSP schemes. They find, however,
that these gains are highly concentrated in a few. higher-income developing countries. Brown (1987, 1989)
draws similar conclusions from a computable general equilibrium model.
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cxtent that tariff prefercnces raise producer prices in the developing countries, they do encourage
greater output of the eligible goods than would take place in their absence. However, production
or those goods entails an opportunity cost, and it is hardly clear that GSP arrangements encourage
the expansion of the industries that will do the most to promote economic growth over the long
haul, That might prove to be the case if. for example, the export activities encouraged by GSP
schemes are "infant industries" subject to positive learning externalities. Given the many product
exclusions and limitations in existing GSP schemes, however, it would be a fortunate coincidence
if the products that are eligible happened also to be the ones that generate learning spillovers.
Likewise, given the way that donor nations exclude import-scnsitive items from tariff preferences
and otherwise "graduate" successful industries and countries, one wonders whether the industries
that offer the best opportunities for "growth" to developing countries are not precisely the ones in
which prefbrenccs will never he offered, or where they will be withdrawn once signs of industrial
success appear. Certainly, there have been no empirical studies to suggest that GSP schemes
have promoted "growth" beyond simply conferring some rents on selected industries as described
above.
Moreover, the benefits of tariff preferences are diminished in practice by compliance
costs. 0 The available evidence suggests that many goods imported from developing countries
that appear to be eligible for preferences do not receive them. UNCTAD (1981) concluded, for
example, that the "utilization rate" for various GSP schemes - the ratio of imports actually
receiving preferential treatment to the total imports that are eligible under each scheme - was
under 50% for the U.S. and European programs and barely over 50% for Japan. One reason
given for the low ratios, though not the only reason, was the "difficulties which arise in
40 Keck and Low (2004) make a similar point in the course of their broader review of special and
differential treatment, and mention several other considerations that we also note as limiting the benefits of
GSP to developing countries..
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complying with the rules of origin and other requirements of the schemes." 4' UNCTAD (1999)
notes a further decline in utilization rates for some of the schemes, owing partly to an "erosion of
preferences which in some cases are too low to compensate for the cost of compliance." Even in
the cases in which preferences are obtained, compliance costs reduce their value.
The benefits from tariff preferences will be further diminished (or even become negative)
if they lead to overinvestmcnt in the sectors that are eligible for preferential treatment. After all,
the very nature of a preference is to encourage the expansion of output to a level that would not
be economical in the absence of the preference. The possibility that preferences may then distort
investment decisions, rather than encouraging investment where long-terni growth opportunities
are present, has been noted elsewhere4 2 One reason to be concerned about such overinvestment is
that preferences have often proven to be temporary, as product coverage and rules about
conditionality and graduation have changed over time. See UNCTAD (1999). If the private
sector invests on the expectation that the preferences will be long-lasting, then there may be
severe resource misallocation once the preferences are removed. Of course. such a misallocation
of resources should not be a problem-al least for the country that is granted preferential
treatment-unless the investors misjudge the likely duration of the GSP schemes, the likelihood
of changes in their rules and product coverage, or the likelihood that the MFN tariff will fall (in
sohrt, an absence pf"rational expectations"). But misjudgment is a real threat given all of the
moving parts and the fact that GSP programs are modified quite regularly.
Finally, there is some evidence in recent research that the benefits to developing countries
from USP schemes may be limited for another reason. Ozden and Reinhardt (2003) argue that
preferential tarifftreatment may retard trade liberalization in beneficiary countries. This might be
"' For a survey of the various approaches to rules of origin in GSP schemes, see chapter 6 in Murray
(1977).
4 See, for example, Finger and Winters (1998), who write that "preferences...permit - perhaps encourage
- producers to have costs above those in nonprcfrred countries."
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so because GSP preferences can reduce the incentive that export industries in developing
countries have to lobby for trade liberalization at home as a means to gamer market access
abroad. Import liberalization by developing countries will also shifl resources from import-
competing to exporting sectors in the those countries and may hasten the withdrawal of tile
preferences as their export sectors bump up against "competitive need" and graduation provisions
under GSP schemes. Export interests in developing countries may harbor mixed feelings about
trade liberalization at home for this reason as well. Ozden and Reinhardt examine empirically the
effect that GSP removal (as through "graduation") has had on former beneficiaries' trade policies
and find that countries that lose their eligibility for GSP subsequently undertake greater
liberalization than those that retain their eligibility. Some studies suggest, furthermore, that
developing countries with more liberal trade policies achieve higher rates of growth and
development than countries that are more protectionist.4-3 If Ozdcn and Reinhardt are correct in
their empirics, therelbre, we have yet another reason to worry that the cflecls of GSP on growth
and development may be less favorable than one might hope.
To summarize, there are no good estimates of the aggregate benefits that developing
countries derive from GSP schemes. Economic theory predicts an improvement in the terms of
trade on eligible products, which may be smaller than the preference margin if the developing
countries collectively are large in the markets for their exports and so depress world prices as they
expand their exports. Benefits beyond the pure terms-of-trade gain are possible if the export
industries happen to be ones that generate positive learning spillovers, but there is no evidence to
suggest that products included in existing GSP schemes are more worthy of encouragement than
others. Compliance costs associated with rules of origin and the like surely cut into the potential
beneficial effects of GSP as well, and exclusions of products deemed "sensitive" in the donor
4" See, for example, Dollar (1992), Sachs and Warner (1995), Edwards (1993) and Franket and Romer
(1999). These studies arc not vwhlhout their critics, however, and sonic like Rodriguez and Rodrik (200 1)
and Hallak and Levinsohn (2004) have questioned whether there really is evidence ofpositive relationship
between openness to trade and growth.
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countries have done so to an even greater extent. Finally. GSP schemes may have encouraged
overinvestment in sectors that will prove only temporarily eligible and may have retarded the
process of trade liberalization in the eligible countries. For all these reasons, tile benefits
generated by tariff preference schemes, while perhaps positive, are likely to be reasonably small.
4.3. Differential Treatment and Conditionality in Tariff Preference Schemes
Whatever economic analysis has to say about the likely benefits of trade preferences in
general. the members of the WTO evidently believe that tariff prefcrence schemes do generate
benefits for the favored countries and that these benefits are sufficient to justify a departure from
the MFN principle. The question raised by India's challenge to the European drug-related
preferences is not whether the gains generated by GSP justify the distortions that it creates, but
rather what sort of discrimination within GSP schlenmes ought to be tolerated.
One might wonder why the members of the WTO would choose to regulate GSP at all.
After all, such schemes represent unilateral *'concessions" made by the developed countries to
further the -'development, financial, and trade" needs of' a group of developing countries.
Shouldn't a donor have the right to set tIhe terms of his gifl and specify the beneficiaries? Don't
the developing countries have the choice whether to meet tile conditions or not?
To address these questions, it is necessary to make some assumptions about the
objectives of the WO Agreement. Like Bagwell and Staiger (1999. 2002) and Grossman and
Mavroidis (2003). we believe that the purpose of trade agreements is to limit the negative
international externalities that countries create when they set their trade and industrial policies.
An externality can arise .hen a welfare-maximizing government sets a positive tariff to improve
its national terms of trade. But one need not accept that governments maximize national
economic welfare as conmentionally defined to conclude that agreements are meant to solve
problems of international externalities. Sovereign governments can and do routinely undertake
policy actions that do not promote aggregate national %vell'are. But their trading partners have no
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reason to interfere in these policy choices unless they suffer some harn as a result. Similarly,
when two (or more) countries strike a bilateral (or plurilateral) agreement, non-parties to the
agreement have no interest in it as long as the agreement does not adversely affect their interests.
But policy choices, including decisions about trade policy, often do have external consequences.
Without some sort of multilateral agreement encompassing all of the affected parties, countries
will set their policies and conclude agreements without regard for the harm done to others,
leading to an equilibrium from which a Pareto improvement is possible with the aid of
multilateral rules. The law of the WTO can be understood as a mechanism to ensure that
international externalities are taken into account.
If the objective of international agreements is to limit negative externalities, we can see
why the WTO members might wish to regulate GSP. As we have discussed, when a country
affords preferential treatment to a group of countries that collectively are large in the market for
some good. the effect is to lower the world price of that good and to generate a tenns-of-trade
loss for other countries that export the same or a similar good. A GSP scheme that targets certain
countries for special treatment can bring harm to others that are not so favored. And a scheme that
offers preferential treatment only when specified conditions are met can reduce welfare for those
that choose not to fulfill the conditions.
The arguments for limiting differential treatment in GSP schemes parallel those that have
made by economists and legal scholars to justify the MFN nle in GATT Article 1. Schwartz and
Sykes (1997) argue that the MFN rule addresses a potential problem of concession erosion.
Suppose country B receives a concession from country A in the course of a trade negotiation, and
that country B is not entitled to MFN treatment from country A. Then. the value of the
concession could be undermined by a subsequent agreement between country A and country C
that provides the latter with even better terms than were granted to country B. Anticipating this
possibility, country B would offer less for the concession from country A and less trade
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liberalization %Nould result. Thus, the MFN rule helps preserve the incentives for trade
liberalization throuch international negotiation.
Bagwell and Staiger (2002, 2004) point to the related concept of bilateral apporunism.
Suppose countries A and B import a common good from country C and export another good to
that country. Suppose further that the three countries have reached an initial agreement that is
jointly efficient, in the sense that no change in tariffs can increase the welfare of one government
Nsithout reducing the welfare of another." Then, in the absence of MFN, the governments of
country A and C can always find another deal that benefits themselves at the expense of country
B. As Bagwell and Staiger show, these countries can reduce the tariffs they apply to one
another's goods in such a wa) that the their multilateral (or weighted average) terms of trade do
not deteriorate; the terms of trade loss each suffers from lowering a tariff is at least offset by the
terms of trade gain each enjoys from improved access to the other's market. But the reduction of
country's C's tariff on imports from A induces trade diversion front competing country B and so
harms that country. And the reduction of country A's tariff on imports from C expands world
demand for C's export good, which spells a further loss for country B. Evidently, in the absence
of MFN. countries A and C may be tempted to strike a deal that benefits each of them at tile
expense of the excluded country C.
Bagwell and Staiger go on to show that an MFN rule makes it more difficult for a pair of
countries to engage in bilateral opportunism. With nondiscrimination, country C must offer the
same concessions to countr) B as it offers to country A. Thus, it cannot offer to "pay for" a tariff
reduction by country A with a policy change of its own that benefits country A by diverting
imports to it that would othen ise come from country B. Indeed, when the MFN rule together is
41 Welfare here may be national economic welfare, if the governments are benevolent welfare maximizers,
or more generally political welfare that includes otlher objectives besides just conventional economic
welfare.
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combined with strict adherence to the principle of "reciprocity", the scope for bilateral
opportunism behavior is eliminated entirely.
4S
Similar problems of concession erosion and bilateral opportunism can arise in a trade
regime that admits differential treatment in GSP. Suppose developed country A makes a
concession to developing country B in the course of a trade negotiation. If country A
subsequently offers reduced tariffs to developing country C, but not to country B. this can erode
the value of the earlier concession to country B. As a consequence, country B may value the
original concession less highly and so will have less incentive to open its own markets. As for
bilateral opportunism, suppose that developed country A considers developing country B to be its
friend and ally. By providing preferential access to its markets, country A generates economic
gains for its ally %%hile furthering its own political ends. Now if country A can do so selectively
(by excluding "sensitive products") and discriminatorily (by making developing country C
ineligible) then country A can ensure that there are few political costs at home, and that most of
the gains to country B come at the expense of other countries, especially countries whose exports
are similar to those of country 13, such as developing country C.
Bagwell and Staigcr (2002) have argued that the provisions of international trade
agreements are intended to diminish or eliminate the scope for negative international
externalities, and that agreements ought to be designed with this goal in mind. This perspcctive,
with which we concur, points to a strict interpretation of footnote 3 of the Enabling Clause as a
binding obligation for developed countries to treat all developing countries similarly in GSP
schemes, except for the permissible special treatment of the least developed countries. However,
we recognize that such an interpretation might well have a chilling effect on the willingness of
45 Bagwell and Staiger define reciprocity in GATT as the principle that changes in trade policy should leave
world prices unchanged, or else those who effect the changes in world prices must compensate those who
are harmed by it. The MFN rule ensures that each country faces a common terms oftrade (relative price of
imports compared to exports) and not a different terms of trade with each partner. Thus, strict adherence to
principles of MFN and reciprocity would imply that any bilateral deal between countries A and C does not
change the relative prices faced by country, as so does not cause any hann to that country.
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developed countries to offer GSP benefits, which after all arc unilateral concessions and not
negotiated as part of any trade agreement. The political realist must ask whether eliminating the
scope for negative externalities is worth the cost of fewer "donated" GSP schemes. Once this
trade-off is recognized. it becomes difficult to say how much differential treatment should be
tolerated and under what circumstances. Economic analysis can highlight the trade-off, but only
empirical and political analysis can determine the magnitude of likely negative externalities on
the one hand. and the likely political response to stricter regulation of GSP on the other.
One other issue warrants brief mention. The externalities associated with trade policy are
not the only externalities from global interaction. Pollution that damages the global commons or
that simply crosses borders affords another class of examples, as do the costs and benefits that
arise because of interdependent utilities across nations. (Indeed, GSP itself might be swen to
result ftom an altruistic concern for the less fortunate.) One might argue that the negative
externalities associated vsith discriminatory GSP schemes should be tolerated if discrimination
nevertheless aids in addressing these other sorts of externalityv problcms. But there is an obvious
difficulty with this line of argument. If preferential treatment is used to address alleged negative
externalities, who among the WTO member states should decide what constitutes a negative
externality and how large is its magnitude? We see no principled way to discipline a process in
which each nation decides for itself what "externalities" to address through discrimination or
reciprocity. And absent any discipline, the danger of a return to the pre-UNCTAD days of
widespread discrimination is apparent. if discrimination and reciprocit) are to be pennitted.
therefore, we question whether they can be justified convincingly by a need to address other
"externality" problems. Instead, the jutlification likely lies in the need to make GSP politically
saleable in tire donor countries, bringing us full circle to the set of tradeoffs identified above.
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